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EXPEDITING ARREST PROCESSING
PatRaburn-Remfryt
INTRODUCTION
Over 200,000 people were arraigned in New York City in
1990.1 The average arrest processing time for these detainees
was forty hours.2 Throughout the processing period, the City
held detainees in pre-arraignment cells. The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY) examined the conditions
of these cells. Their investigation revealed that the cells were
dark, crowded, and fetid. Excrement clogged the plumbing.4
Detainees undergoing drug or alcohol withdrawal had no access
to medical treatment. 5
During 1990, the New York City Police Department's policy
was to arrest all felons, as well as any misdemeanant who could
not provide proper identification. 6 One detainee was Sei Boo,
an itinerant peddler whose only crime was selling umbrellas
without a license. Police incarcerated Sei Boo in squalor for
fifty hours prior to his arraignment.'
Prosecutions against

t J.D., Seton Hall Law School; M.L.S. Columbia University School of
Library Services. The author worked for several years as an Assistant District
Attorney in New York City. She is presently employed in the Reference
Department of the Hofstra University Law School Library.
The author would like to give special thanks to Professor Fred Cohen of
the State University of New York in Albany for his guidance in the development of this research from a concept to a completed article. She would also
like to thank her husband Ken Remfry for his patience and encouragement.
' Sol Wachtler, The State of the Judiciary(1990).
2

Id.

3 COMMITTEE ON CORRECTIONS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

NEW YORK, Inadequaciesof the New York City CourtPre-arraignmentPens, 45
RECORD NYCBA 390, 391 (1990) [hereinafter ABCNY CORRECTIONS REPORT].
4 Id. at 394.
5

Id. at 395.
'New York criminal procedure, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 150.30 (McKinney
1981 & Supp. 1991), permits the arresting officer to issue a Desk Appearance
Ticket (DAT) (a citation for a future court date), for certain classes of E felons
and misdemeanants. The New York City Police Department incarcerates all
those who cannot produce identification or who are visibly, physically or
mentally impaired by drugs or alcohol.
' People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990), affd, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
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offenders such as Sei Boo were routinely resolved at arraignment by pleas to disorderly conduct and time served.'
Such situations are not unique to New York City. Riverside, California, a few years earlier, imprisoned detainees for
periods of up to one hundred and twenty-five hours in equally
deplorable conditions.9 Detainees often slept on the floors of
the overcrowded detention cells without bedding. ° Furthermore, detainees alleged that the County failed to provide adequate supervision in the holding cells."
Conditions in affluent suburban communities were frequently no better than in New York City or Riverside. Fairfax
County, Virginia, held 7,056 people for arraignment in 1989.12
Approximately eighty-five percent of those detained were addicted to drugs. Regardless of the detainees' physical or psychological conditions, the County treated all individuals jailed on minor
charges in the same manner as those jailed for murder."3 The
County transported detainees from the Fairfax County Adult
Detention Center to the nearby Fairfax County Courthouse.
Officers searched detainees for drugs, weapons, and other contraband prior to production at the Arraignment Court. 4 Afterwards, armed guards handcuffed detainees and escorted them to
the basement holding cells of the courthouse where as many as
8 Interview with Michelle Maxian, Legal Aid Society, in New York, N.Y.

(Jan. 23, 1991).
' The Cal. Penal Code §§ 825, 991 (West 1988) permitted local authorities
up to forty-eight hours to produce detainees for arraignment. Since this
statute excluded weekends and holidays from the compilation, arrestees could
be detained up to five days before receiving a probable cause hearing. Over
the Thanksgiving Holiday, a seven day delay was possible. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1991).
"0In the initial complaint before Federal District Court Judge Gadbois,
petitioners alleged that the Riverside County Jail was severely overcrowded
and that detainees were often forced to sleep on the floor of triple-bunked
cells. Detainees also charged that they were subjected to excessive force by
the guards. Joint Appendix, Volume I at 5, Riverside (No. 89-1817).
11 Id.

12 In 1989, approximately 26,000 were arrested in Fairfax County. Most of

those arrested were released on bond or personal recognizance. Most of those
held over for criminal court arraignment were physically or emotionally
impaired. Comments by Sgt. Edward Schifko of the Fairfax County Virginia's
Sheriffs Office in Camera Ready Inmates, Fairfax County Will Use Video To
Arraign Inmates, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1990, at C1.
13 Id.
14 1d_
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twenty-five inmates were chained together and brought by
elevator
to the holding cells adjacent to the Arraignment
15
Court.
The length and terms of pre-arraignment confinement
procedures have recently become the subject of federal and state
court scrutiny. In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 6 the
Supreme Court ruled that under the promptness requirement of
Gerstein v. Pugh,' persons detained pursuant to a warrantless
arrest must ordinarily receive a probable cause hearing within
forty-eight hours of the arrest. 8 Local authorities who meet
this requirement are immune from systemic attacks on the
reasonableness of their arrest processing policies and procedures. 9 If local authorities fail to provide a probable cause
hearing within forty-eight hours, they must demonstrate that
exigent circumstances or a bona fide emergency barred earlier
production of the detainee.2"
Probable cause hearings can be ex-parte and non-adversarial.2 ' The hearing may consist of nothing more than an
impartial reading of the complaint by a magistrate to substantiate that the complaint states a prima facie case of probable
cause." Legislatures throughout the United States, however,

15d.

1 In Riverside, a class action was brought to challenge the timeliness with
which the County of Riverside provided probable cause hearings. At issue was
the County's policy of combining probable cause hearings with arraignment
proceedings. 111 S.Ct. at 1661.
'1In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court held that
those arrested without a warrant were entitled to the same impartial judicial
assessment of probable cause as those arrested with a warrant.
" Riverside, 111 S.Ct. at 1670.
19

Id.

20

id.

" The Gerstein Court held that cross-examination and assistance of counsel
are not required because the probable cause hearing is not considered a
critical stage of the pretrial proceedings. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 123.
The Gerstein Court approved the use of an informal proceeding:
not only [because of] the lesser consequences of the probable cause
hearing but also [because of] the nature of the determination itself.
It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a
reasonable doubt or a preponderance standard demands and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the
evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt.
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have chosen to promulgate procedures that incorporate the
probable cause hearing into an in personam arraignment and
bail application." These rules, in combination with Riverside,
now require these jurisdictions to process and produce an
arrestee for the arraignment and bail hearing within forty-eight
hours of arrest.24
The processing required for these arraignment and bail
hearings is much more complex than that required for production and review of a criminal court complaint. At the bail
hearing, local authorities must provide the arrestee's prior
criminal history, finances, ties to the community and likelihood
of returning to court if released.25 Local authorities must also
ensure that the accusatory instrument properly charges the
crimes allegedly committed by the detainee.

' States can sever the probable cause hearing from the bail application.
This was done in Orange County, California to comply with a thirty-six hour
time limitation for probable cause hearings imposed by Judge Gadbois in Scott
v. Gates, C.V. 84-8647 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1988). To cope with the accelerated
production period, Orange County appointed a judicial hearing officer who
conducted probable cause hearings at the local jail. In 1988, 14,557 hearings
were held. Joint Appendix, Volume 2 at 168-9, County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (No. 89-1817).
No jurisdiction, however, has voluntarily chosen to sever the probable
cause hearing from the arraignment since this additional step merely adds
additional procedures to a criminal justice system, which, in the words of the
Gerstein Court, is "already overburdened by the volume of cases and complexities of the system." Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122.
Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 set forth the following criteria:
1) nature and circumstances of the offense
2) weight of the evidence
3) family ties
4) employment
5) financial resources
6) character
7) mental condition
8) length of residence in the community
9) record of convictions
10) record of appearances in court proceedings
11) flight to avoid prosecution
12) failure to appear at court proceedings
18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g) (1988).
26 Accusatory instruments are subject to dismissal where the instrument
fails to state specific facts which apprise the defendant of what he must be
prepared to meet and enable the courts to decide whether the facts alleged are
sufficient to support a conviction. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749
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Although Riverside does not address acceptable conditions
of pre-arraignment confinement, the legal community highly
scrutinizes such conditions. 7 In Youngblood v. Gates,2 s a
California state appellate court ruled that the government has
a duty to provide acceptable conditions of confinement and
treatment for mental and physical diseases.29 Since many
detainees suffer from alcoholism, drug addiction, AIDS, tuberculosis, and other opportunistic diseases, 0 this mandate could
"empty the coffers" of local governments if strictly enforced.
Furthermore, a federal district court in the Second Circuit
ruled in Hodge v. Ruperto3 ' that the Constitution 2 guaranteed detainees adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
medical care, and safety.3" The Report of the Criminal Justice
Committee of the ABCNY revealed that New York City did not
adequately provide these necessities in 1990."4
The Riverside decision places judges sitting in arraignment
courts in a quandary. The Riverside majority warns judges that
judicial intervention in arrest processing violates the separation
of the legislative and judicial branches or functions of government. 5 Yet the arraignment judge must obtain timely production of detainees from agencies charged with custody if he is to
promptly arraign'those assigned to his court.
The Riverside decision also presents a dilemma to criminal
justice administrators responsible for arrest processing. Administrators must expedite arrest processing to meet federal due
process mandates despite spiraling arrests and diminishing
local resources 6 that play havoc with the symbiotic relations
(1962).

27See ABCNY CORRECTIONs REPORT, supra note 3, at 390.
' Youngblood v. Gates, 246 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1988).
29Id. at 788, 790.
30 SAIRA MOINI AND THEODORE HAMMEIT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1989
UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1990).
Hodge v. Ruperto, 739 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
32
1Id. at 876.
33

Id.

3 ABCNY

CORRECTIONS REPORT, supra note 3.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1671 (1991).
In many urban areas the number of criminal cases has risen substantially, in a large part as a result of the wide spread use of crack. For example in
New York City drug related crimes have risen 249% in the last five years.
33
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of the numerous agencies that interact to process detainees. 7
State statutes and court decisions that mandate even shorter
periods from arrest to arraignment than the constitutional
minimum under Riverside also cause concern. People ex rel.
Maxian v. Brown,38 decided a few weeks before Riverside,
requires administrators in New York State to produce detainees
for arraignment within twenty-four hours of arrest or provide an
acceptable explanation for the delay. 9 The New York State
Court of Appeals specifically rejected cries of lack of funding for
expedited arrest processing as an insufficient reason for delays
in arraignment.4 °

Wachtler, supra note 1, at 40.
In New York State in 1991-1992, New York State Courts received $874.2
million, $75.2 million less than requested and $39 million less than the year
before. Andrew Blum, Systems Try to Stretch Their Dollars, 13 NAT'L L.J.,
July 1, 1991, at 25.
In Detroit, Michigan, felony drug arrests increased by 270% from 1986
through 1989. Randall Samborn, CourtingSolutions, 13 NAr'L L.J., July 1,
1991, at 26.
In California, where the state has traditionally made up for shortfalls in
the funding of trial courts costs for processing arrests, state funding for courts
fell from 44% of the local court budget in 1989-90 to 38% in 1990-91 despite a
10% increase in court administrative expenses. Blum, supra at 25.
" The Second Circuit in Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 48 U.S. 1020 (1989) reversed a lower court order mandating that
certain city officials (including the Mayor, Chief of Police and Chief of Corrections) ensure that arrestee be arraigned within twenty-four hours of arrest.
The Second Circuit based its reversal in part on the fact that with seven
independent agencies coordinating the production of each defendant, petitioners failed to provide proof that the named defendants could legally provide the
relief demanded by the plaintiff class.
38 People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991). The Legal
Aid Society (LAS) brought successive class actions in an effort to reduce prearraignment delay from forty hours to twenty-four hours. After failing in
Williams to obtain the relief sought under federal law, LAS succeeded under
Maxian in state court. See Williams, 845 F.2d at 374. See also Maxian, 561
N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), affd, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
39
Id.
40 The decision of the Appellate Division, 1st Department, was especially
scornful of the argument that inadequate resources were an acceptable cause
for delay:
[D]elay is not necessarily within the meaning of the statute unless
it is delay which could not have been reasonably foreseen and either
reduced or eliminated. Clearly, there is nothing necessary about
delays resulting from the long standing failure of the government to
take reasonable remedial measures, including of course the alloca-
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This article charts the development of the twenty-four hour
outer time limit for processing detainees adopted by New York
and then considers changes New York City made to comply.
Part I introduces us to Michael Cardwell. The story of his
arrest and the bureaucratic delays before his arraignment
present, in human terms, the need for prompt processing. The
Supreme Court first addressed processing concerns in Gerstein.
However, the ambiguities in the Gerstein holding lead to a
series of cases to resolve questions left unanswered. The courts
then attempted to catalogue the steps incident to arrests and to
identify the consequences of delayed probable cause hearings.
Next, courts articulated specific conditions of pre-arraignment
detentions which would be acceptable.
The most difficult question left unanswered by the Gerstein
Court was the definition of the outer time limit of a prompt
arraignment. The Federal District Court in Williams suggested
a twenty-four hour time limit, but this decision was overturned
by the Second Circuit. Among other concerns, the Second
Circuit argued that the twenty-four hour time limit might not
guarantee the full range of a detainee's rights at arraignment.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this same issue in Riverside. That
court noted that other courts had required a twenty-four hour
production rule and ordered Riverside County to provide probable cause hearings within thirty-six hours of arrest. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and concluded that forty-eight
hours was the mandatory outer time limit for prompt arraignments.
In Maxian, the New York Court of Appeals agreed with the
lower courts that arraignments must take place within twentyfour hours of arrest. In order to implement this decision, New
York City has adopted administrative, procedural, and even
technological changes in their processing system, which will be
considered in Part II. Other jurisdictions can evaluate and
adopt those elements of the New York system which might
facilitate their own processing of pre-arraignment detainees.

tion of resources adequate to the efficient discharge of its prearraignment responsibilities.
Maxian, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
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I. FEDERAL AND STATE STANDARDS FOR THE PROMPT
PROCESSING OF DETAINEES HELD PURSUANT
TO A WARRANTLESS ARREST
A. ONE EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATORS IN THE TIMELY PRODUCTION OF
DETAINEES: THE PRE-ARRAIGNMENT DETENTION OF
MICHAEL CARDWELL

At 10:40 p.m., January 16, 1990, New York City Police
Officer Margaret Kerwin pulled over the automobile Michael
Cardwell was driving. Officer Kerwin ran the license plate and
vehicle identification number of the car.4 1 Both plate and auto
came back as stolen. Officer Kerwin then placed Michael
Cardwell under arrest and took him to the local precinct. There
he was searched, fingerprinted and photographed.4 2 Officer
Kerwin filled out the On Line Booking System (OLBS) Report
and notified TXT Rent-a-Car that their automobile had been
recovered.43
Just before midnight, Officer Kerwin took Cardwell to the
Manhattan Central Booking Unit, where she deposited Mr.
Cardwell, his prints, and the OLBS Report. Ordinarily, Officer
Kerwin would report to the complaint room to speak with an
Assistant District Attorney (ADA) about the arrest. However,
the officer went off duty because the complaint room had closed

41 When automobiles and license plates are reported as stolen, the officer

taking the information places the information in a computer system. Any
officer on patrol can call up this information through a radio in his vehicle.
Where license plates are affixed to an automobile that does not match the
make, model and year of the assigned plate, the police have reasonable
suspicion that either the car or plates were stolen. Automobile manufacturers
affix individual vehicle identification numbers to the vehicles, which are also
placed in the police information system.
42 OLBS is the information system used by NYPD for logging in arrests.
Information can be accessed from this system by various fields, such as arrest
number, defendant's name and arresting officer's name and shield number.
" In New York City, when a detainee lacks proper registration, the police
regularly verify with the owner of the vehicle to ensure that the detainee did
not have permission to take or possess the vehicle.
This procedure of confirming illegal possession through the owner of the
car often leads to lengthy delays in the processing of the detainees charged
with theft of vehicles. Frequently, the arresting officer may not be able to
contact the owner of the vehicle for several hours. This is especially true on
weekends when the owners may be miles away from the city.
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for the night. In the early hours of January 17, 1990,
Cardwell's fingerprint card was faxed by Central Booking
personnel to the central depository for fingerprint classifications
in New York State, the Department of Criminal Justice Services
(DCJS)" located in Albany, New York. A member of the CJA
verified his community ties.4"
At 5:30 a.m., DCJS returned the computerized classification
of Cardwell's fingerprints to Central Booking. At 8:00 a.m.,
Officer Kerwin came back on duty. She immediately reported to
the District Attorney's complaint room where she was interviewed by an ADA. Based on his questioning of the officer, the
ADA drew up a complaint and Officer Kerwin swore to the
veracity of the facts therein.4 6

" DCJS oversees the central depository for fingerprint identification
records in Albany, New York. New York State was one of the first states to
develop a software program for the retrieval of a defendant's prior criminal
history by matching his fingerprints with a batch of prints culled from those
in the DCJS mainframe computer. This culling is initially based on sorting
through identification information such as name, address, or social security
number.
15 CJA is an independent, non-profit organization whose services are
contracted for by the City of New York. A CJA staff member interviews the
defendant confidentially and then verifies the defendant's name, address, place
of employment and ties to the community.
4' The police officer must swear to the affidavit's truth because the
affidavit serves as the factual basis for the court's ruling on probable cause to
arrest at arraignment. Many years ago, the officer would be present at the
arraignment to orally testify as to the facts that resulted in his arresting the
detainees. This practice was stopped in the 1970s because the legislature
found exorbitant the administrative cost of producing officers at arraignment.
See Act of May 1, 1970, ch. 434, § 150-b, 1970 N.Y. LAWS 933 (complaint
verification); § 150-b, Memorandum of Nassau County, Police verification of
Felony complaints, reprintedin 1970 NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL
48.
Ordinarily, the arresting officer accompanies the defendant to the Central
Booking Unit where the identification of the arrestee is confirmed through the
faxing of fingerprints to and from DCJS. Afterwards, under NYPD procedure,
the arresting officer confers with an Assistant District Attorney to determine
the charges to be brought.
Based on the facts given by the arresting officer, the defendant may be
charged up as a felony or down as a misdemeanor. Factors to be considered
in charging up or down include prior relationship between complainant and
victim, injury to the victim, and provocation by the victim.
Thereafter, the defendant is to be taken directly to the arraignment part.
In Manhattan County, the arraignment parts run twenty-four hours. Evidently on January 16, 1990, the pens at Central Booking were so overcrowded that
Cardwell had to be transported to another precinct with holding space until
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At 8:15 a.m., Cardwell was "paper ready"'4 for arraignment. However, because the pens at the court were full,
Cardwell was transferred to the holding cells of the sixth precinct. Fifteen more hours elapsed before Cardwell was taken to
the court pens at 100 Centre Street and transferred into the
custody of the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC).
Forty-two hours later, on the morning of January 19, 1990,
Michael Cardwell was provided with a public defender and
produced for arraignment.4"
As illustrated above, pre-arraignment processing requires a
synchronization of several autonomous government agencies:
NYPD, DOC, the District Attorney, the Legal Aid Society (LAS),
and the 18B panel, " CJA, and DCJS. When the actions of
one agency processing arraignments is out of sync, papers and
detainees become backlogged. Too frequently, a backlog in one
agency's tasks precipitates a bottleneck in another agency's
procedures.50 This is especially true when police crackdowns
on drug sales, prostitution or even farebeating on subways
increase the number of arrests.

his paperwork was complete.
" The paperwork that accompanies the defendant to the arraignment part
includes: 1) the CJA sheet confirming community ties, 2) the DCJS prior
criminal history sheet, and 3) the sworn complaint of the arresting officer.
When cell space is available in the arraignment part, the defendant and his
paperwork are simultaneously transported to the Criminal Court for arraignment.
' People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 423 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990), aftd, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
" The City of New York has contracted with the Legal Aid Society to act
as the public defender. Where criminal acts are committed by two or more
people, conflicts of interest may arise; therefore attorneys from the 18B panel
are assigned to each additionally co-defendant. The term 18B refers to N.Y.
COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1991) which delegates authority to local
governments to assign a private attorney to represent co-defendants.
50
As previously stated, the bottlenecks are exacerbated by inadequate prearraignment holding pens. Once the pens at Central Booking and the arraignment parts fill up, the defendants are shuttled throughout the NYPD system
in search of NYPD holding pens. These multiple transfers frequently result in
the defendant's paperwork being misplaced, greatly contributing to prolonged
delays in individual arraignments. COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, The Arrest to
Arraignment Process, 45 RECORD NYCBA 172, 175-77 (1990) [hereinafter
ABCNY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT].
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B. FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PROMPT PROCESSING OF
ARRESTEES

1. Prompt Probable Cause Hearing: Gerstein v. Pugh
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue
of prompt arrest processing in Gerstein v. Pugh.5" In this
decision, the Supreme Court nullified a Florida statute that
permitted police to jail a warrantless detainee or subject them
to other restraints pending trial without an opportunity for a
probable cause hearing.5 2 Justice Powell wrote, "[T]he Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause
as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following
arrest." 3
The Gerstein Court would have preferred police procedures
in which warrants were obtained prior to an arrest, but nevertheless accepted the necessity of warrantless arrests for crime
control. 4 The Court warned police, however, that such detentions are permissible only for the brief time it takes to complete
the administrative steps necessary for arrest processing and to
transport the arrestee to a magistrate. 5 Unfortunately, antiquated equipment, facilities, and transportation often obstruct
arrest processing so that this "brief time" may be hours, even
days, of incarceration.
The Gerstein Court also developed vague and sometimes
contradictory guidelines balancing the state's duty to control
crime with the individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.5" The Court did not want to dictate

51 420 U.S. 103 (1974).
52 The Gerstein Court noted that the Fourth Amendment's "protection

consists in requiring those inferences [of probable cause] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 11213 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
53Id. at 114.

' The Gerstein Court pondered requiring a magistrate to review factual
justification prior to any arrest. The Court rejected this requirement as an
intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Id. at 113.
5

Id. at 113-14. Police may continue to detain only those individuals for
whom a magistrate validates the arresting officer's assessment of probable
cause. Id. at 114.
5

Id. at 112.
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specific procedures for arrest processing," nor did the Court
choose to describe a bright line separating those police activities
incidental to arrest processing
from those activities beyond
58
processing.
arrest
necessary
The Court did, however, cite the procedures set forth in the
American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedures,5 9 as an example of appropriate experimentation.
These procedures incorporate the probable cause hearing into
the arraignment and bail hearing, delaying the probable cause
hearing until the detainee is "paper ready," and produced before
the arraignment court.6" Unfortunately, probable cause hearings have been delayed hours, even days, after completion of the
procedures incident to arrest so that the police could gather
information necessary for the arraignment and bail
application.6

5' The Gerstein court concluded:
There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of
the probable cause determination usually will be shaped to accord
with a State's pretrial procedure viewed as a whole. While we limit
our holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
we recognize the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by
the States. ... In some States, existing procedures may satisfy the
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Others may require only
minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing preliminary
hearings. Current proposals for criminal procedure reform suggest
other ways of testing probable cause for detention.
Id. at 123-25.
58

id.

59

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 310, (Tentative Draft
No. 5A, 1973), quoted in Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 124-25 n.25 This draft allowed
a forty-eight hour adjournment for a probable cause hearing to be held within
seventy-two hours of arrest. Subsequent drafts of the ALI Model Code deleted
this provision. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 310
(1975).

60 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310. A detainee is
"paper ready" when police complete the pre-arraignment paperwork, including
independent confirmation of community ties, the prior criminal history sheet,
and the sworn affidavit of the arresting officer.
"' Courts have allowed considerable delay before probable cause hearings.
See, e.g., Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1020 (1989) (permitting pre-arraignment detentions of seventy-two hours
where the criminal justice system provides "additional safeguards.") But cf.,
Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (D.D.C. 1978) (generally law
enforcement officials should complete arrest processing within one and one
half hours of arrest).
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2. LitigationResulting from Ambiguities in
Gerstein v. Pugh
a. Defining Steps Incident to an Arrest
As illustrated in the arrest of Michael Cardwell, after
taking a suspect into custody the police photograph and fingerprint the detainee, then send the prints to a central record
keeping facility for classification. Those detainees not immediately released may wait hours pending the return of the fingerprint classification.6 2 Aware of these delays, the court in Lively v. Cullinane," held that officials must provide a probable
cause hearing prior to photographing and fingerprinting detainees." Further, the court ruled that when it would unduly
prolong detention, police officers need not complete all their
paperwork prior to the probable cause hearing.6 5 The court in
Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc,6 6 held that denying those accused
of non-violent misdemeanors the opportunity of posting bond
prior to confirmation of identification was unreasonable.

Members of the defense bar have brought lawsuits in several jurisdictions
arguing that the police must either expedite arraignments or separate the
probable cause hearing from the arraignment so that a magistrate can
promptly adjudicate probable cause. See e.g., Williams, 845 F.2d at 374;
Bernard v. Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983); Sanders v. City of
Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), affd without opinion, 741 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1984); Lively, 451 F. Supp. 1000; Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F.
Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd inpart sub nom. Dommer v. Crawford, 653
F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981).
' The public defenders' society in New York City, the Legal Aid Society,
brought a lawsuit in 1990 to compel the NYPD to change their policy and
issue DATs to all those charged with petty crimes. The trial court dismissed
this law suit ruling that there was no law which prohibited the police from
exercising their discretion and incarcerating suspects rather than issuing
these suspects' DATs. Mullins v. Ward, 203 N.Y.L.J. 37, at 26 (Sup. Ct., Feb.
26, 1990).
In 1990, it became the policy in New York State to release detainees
accused of non-violent misdemeanors and E felons. See Edward A. Adams,
Policy on Desk Appearance Tickets Changed by Police, 206 N.Y.L.J. 102, at 1
(Nov. 25, 1991); Selwin Raab, Police Crack Down on No-Show Suspects, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1991, at B3.
' 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978).
64Id. at 1003.
'Id. at 1004.
'6797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028 (1986).
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b. Defining the Consequences of a Delayed
Probable Cause Hearing
In holding that states cannot detain arrestees absent a
probable cause hearing, the Gerstein Court did not state that a
Gerstein violation triggered the right to immediate release.6 7
Some jurisdictions mandate the release the detainee on his own
recognizance.6" Other jurisdictions impose criminal sanctions
on government workers who fail to process detainees' paperwork
or to produce detainees at probable cause hearings.6 9
Where local policies and procedures cause undue delay,
Gerstein did authorize federal suits against local authorities for
civil damages.7 ° Detainees may also hold liable in common law
tort those public officials acting outside the scope of their
employment.7 Detainees who can prove that a corporation's
employees acted "in unison" with the police may join the corporation as a party. Nevertheless, the mere fact that an arrest
was found to be lacking probable cause does not automatically
result in a judgment for false arrest against either the arresting
officer or the local government.7 3 The detainee must prove
that the officer's actions were neither reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances nor predicated on a good faith
belief that probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. 4
The Gerstein Court did not discuss the consequences of a
determination of undue delay for the admissibility of confessions
Some
or contraband obtained during that incarceration. 5

67 Neither does the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure offer a

remedy for a Gerstein violation. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 310 (1975).

68ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 4.1.
69 ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-10 (1988); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 544.170 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-23 (Supp. 1992).
70

420 U.S. at 103, 107 n.5 (1974).

71W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON on THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 11 (5th ed. 1984).
72 Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1028 (1987).
73Id. at 441-442.
7 See id. at 438-39.
7 In Search and Seizure, Wayne LeFave has the following comments on
the impact of a Gerstein violation on dismissal of the charges or suppression
of evidence:
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jurisdictions have held that lengthy detentions necessarily taint
such evidence. Most jurisdictions, however, have not imposed
an automatic bar on admissibility; rather, they hold that the
trial court must look to the circumstances of the detention to
determine, for example, whether the detainee offered a confession voluntarily. 6
c. Specifying Acceptable Conditionsfor
Pre-ArraignmentDetention
The Gerstein Court recognized detentions prior to a determination of probable cause are permissible only for the brief time
necessary to complete arrest processing and to transport the
arrestee to a magistrate."' Beyond permitting the inference
that such detentions must be neither investigatory nor punitive,
the Court did not prescribe minimum conditions under which
pre-arraignment detainees could be incarcerated.
Federal courts, however, have become active in overseeing
prison management,78 ensuring that corrections officials meet

The Supreme Court did not speculate (on the consequences that
flow from the failure to comply with Gerstein) except to note that it
was not retreating from the established rule that illegal arrest or
detention does not void a subsequent conviction. [See In re Walters,
543 P.2d 607 (Cal. 1975)].
In terms of exclusion of evidence, the impact of Gerstein will be
limited. In a case where there is less than probable cause, the
failure to determine the fact promptly and release the defendant is
not particularly significant from an exclusionary rule standpoint, as
evidence obtained incident to arret is subject to suppression in any
event. And when.., there was probable cause at the moment of
arrest but it dissipates shortly thereafter, Gerstein is again not
significant, for even prior to Gerstein,it has been held that evidence
obtained from the defendant after the point when probable cause no
longer exists must be suppressed. [See United States v. Coughlin,
338 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mich. 1972).]
2 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.1(f) (2d ed. 1987) (footnote omitted).
76 Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession or Other
Statements Made by Defendant asAffected by Delay on Arraignment, 28 A.L.R.
4th 1121, 1138-78 (1984).
' Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1974).
78 David Gottlieb, The Legacy of Wolfish v. Chapman: Some Thoughts
About "BigPrisonCase," Litigation in the 1980s, in PRISONERS AND THE LAW
2-7, 2-9 (Ira Robbins ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988).
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their obligation to provide humane conditions.7 9 These courts
have held that conditions of incarceration should be the minimum necessary to detain arrestees, ° and mandated that states
provide post-arraignment detainees and convicted criminals
with adequate
medical care,"' recreation,8 2 and training pro3
8

grams.

In Bell v. Wolfish," the Supreme Court reversed a Second
Circuit holding that practices such as double bunking, routine
strip searches, and a ban on packages from family and friends
violated the due process rights of pre-arraignment detainees. 5
Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[T]hat conditions are unpleasant does
not mean they constitute punishment. Punishment occurs only
where corrections officials maintain inadequate conditions for
the express purpose of punishment, or where they cannot link
the inadequacy to a legitimate governmental or operational
concern." 6 The Supreme Court further ruled that courts must
give considerable discretion to corrections officials on whether
inadequacies, including systematic neglect, constitute punishment or operational necessities.8 7
Despite Bell and other more recent Supreme Court deci88
sions discouraging judicial oversight of prison operations,
district courts continue to regulate the conditions under which
pre-trial detainees and post-conviction prisoners can be held. 9
'9

Id. at 2-24, 2-25.

' See Note, "Hands-Off'the House of Detention: PretrialDetaineesand the
Illusion of Innocence, 49 U. CINN. L. REv. 462 (1980); Note, Standards of
Judicial Review for Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 63 MINN.L.REv. 457
(1979); Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Conditions of PretrialDetention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1971).
81 Adequate medical treatment must be provided to prisoners under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
82 Exercise programs must be made available. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d
189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979).
"3PRESIENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 14, 15 (1967).
' 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
85Id.
7

at 520-22.

Id. at 520.
Id. at 548, 562.

' Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 338 (1981); Block v. Rutherford, 468
U.S. 576 (1984); Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 313 (1985); Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2322 (1991).
89 In 1985, over 130 jails were under court order to limit their population
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In stark contrast, few courts have prescribed a difference in
conditions under which the court can hold pre-arraignment
detainees and pre-trial detainees, 0 notwithstanding the substantial differences in their legal status. Several courts have
treated the pre-arraignment detainees as if they were pre-trial
detainees when in fact their legal status is quite different.9
One explanation for the lack of regulation of the conditions
of pre-arraignment confinement is the traditional belief that the
detainee becomes a ward of the court only after arraignment.
Another is the reluctance of courts to spend judicial resources
overseeing conditions of confinement for persons whom they
believe spend only short periods of time incarcerated. The same
courts which demand humane conditions for other classes of
prisoners have failed to acknowledge the deplorable conditions
and long hours many detainees must endure while awaiting
arraignment.
As previously stated, a movement exists to improve the
conditions of pre-arraignment confinement in lower federal and
state courts. In People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown,92 the court
rebuked local authorities for confining detainees in appalling
conditions where detainees were subject to extraordinary psychological and physical stress.93 In Hodge v. Ruperto,94 a pre-

because of over crowding or other conditions. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES, 1985, at 8 (1987).
o For example, see Hille v. Wright, 400 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
and Gordon v. City of New York, 502 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 839
(1987). Both cases involved tort suits against municipalities for injuries
sustained by pre-arraignment detainees. Both courts analyzed the obligation
of the municipality as no greater than its obligation to any other pre-trial
detainee, despite the. fact that no judicial officer had assessed the validity of
the arrest.
91
Pre-trial detainees have not been convicted of any crime. Brenneman v.
Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 137 (N.D. Cal. 1972). A pre-trial detainee has
appeared before a court. Although the detainee is presumed innocent, the
court has found that the complaint against the detainee is legally sufficient,
and has set bail based on the probability that the defendant will return for
trial without the threat of financial penalty. Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,
supra note 25. A pre-arraignment detainee is held under color of authority,
which dissipates unless the court retroactively authorizes the arrest. County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 561 N.Y.S.2d 418,424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), affd, 570 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y.
1991).
9
3 Id. at 422.
' 739 F.Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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arraignment detainee alleged that corrections officers deprived
him of food and water for two and a half days and confined him
to an overcrowded unsanitary cell. The court denied the defen-

dant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that
the detainee's claim alleged "sufficiently egregious conduct" to
infer that the conduct was attributable to municipal policy,9 5
and that the detainee's claim of inadequate supervision in the
cells allowed a reasonable inference that the supervisors were
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of the detain6
ee.

9

In Youngblood v. Gates,9 the California Court of Appeals
upheld a lower court order mandating that Los Angeles provide
sanitary conditions for pre-arraignment detainees, which include the opportunity for daily showers and shaves and access
to sanitary materials and toothbrushes. 9' City officials must
also insure diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental
illnesses.99 Finally, they must provide detainees with newspapers, board games, and opportunities for brief daily visits with
family.100
d. Defining the Outer Limit of a PromptArraignment
i. Second Circuit'sRuling in Williams v. Ward
Public defenders and public interest groups seeking a
federal forum for reforming local procedures for arrest processing brought class actions in federal courts charging that their
clients were deprived of the right to a prompt review of the

95 Id. at 877-78.
96

Id. at 878.

"' In the late 1970's the American Civil Liberties Union brought a class
action against various criminal justice officials in Los Angeles, California,
challenging under state law, arraignment delays and confinement conditions.
After several amendments to the complaint and consolidation with a second
class action, the matter went to a hearing before Justice Harry Hupp on
October 25, 1982. On March 9, 1983, Justice Hupp issued his opinion in favor
of the petitioners. On May 4, 1988, the Court of Appeals of the 2d District,
4th Division, affirmed the lower court order. Youngblood v. Gates, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (1988).
98 Id. at 790.
9 Id. at 791.
1

0oId. at 789-90.
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probable cause for arrest. 1 ' In most jurisdictions, although
the cases are couched in terms of unreasonable seizures and the
necessity of a timely probable cause hearing, the real issue is
the length of time an arrestee can be incarcerated prior to being
produced for arraignment.0 2
In New York City in early 1985, four pre-arraignment
detainees brought a class action individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated against Benjamin Ward (then
Police Commissioner of New York City), Richard Koehler (then
Commissioner of Corrections), and Edward Koch (the former
Mayor of New York). 3
These detainees sought judicial review of local arrest processing procedures for compliance with
Gerstein.' Federal District Court Judge, Constance Motley,
agreed to hear the complaints of the class. On October 17,
1986, while the parties attempted to mediate their differences,
Judge Motley advanced the matter and consolidated it with a
motion for a preliminary injunction against Benjamin Ward and
all other custodians of pre-arraignment detainees in New York
County held in excess of twenty-four hours. Thereafter, the
parties agreed to submit stipulated facts.' 5
These facts suggested some changes in procedures which
could reduce arrest processing time.'0 6 For example, obsolete
equipment could be replaced and record keeping simplified,
standardized, and more frequently updated. Upon review of

...
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
2
..
Although petitioners demanded their due process rightto a prompt trial
hearing, none insisted that the arraignment procedures of their diverse
jurisdictions be radically modified; rather, the petitioners demanded that
arrest to arraignment processing time be reduced so that the arraignment and
bail determination occurred within the time envisioned by the Gerstein Court
for a prompt probable cause hearing. Detainees did not seek to bifurcate the
arraignment and the probable cause hearing because the probable cause
hearing, as delineated by the Gerstein Court, did not provide the remedy
sought by a majority of the detainees, release on bail.
103 Williams v. Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 845 F.2d 374
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989).
"o'While the local practices reviewed included the procedures of all the
separate agencies involved in the production of the detainees, the public
defender was especially concerned with the amount of time it took for fingerprint identification information to be transmitted from local precincts in New
York City to DCJS in Albany. Id. at 226-27, 230-31.
15
o Id. at 228.

'lorId. at 231.
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this stipulation and the testimony of both sides, Judge Motley
concluded that twenty-four hours allowed sufficient time to
process an arrest in New York City. I'
Despite specific incidents set forth in the lower court decision, the Second Circuit found that the stipulated facts provided
"little illumination as to the bottlenecks that delayed arraignments."'I 8 Absent these findings, the Circuit Court rejected
the lower court's holding as merely conclusory 09 The Second
Circuit was especially disdainful of the lower court's recommendation that the police take fewer people into custody and that
the City provide more personnel for the task of processing
detainees."0
The appellate court also rejected the district court's conclusion that despite the scarcity of resources presently available,
arraignment must ordinarily occur within twenty-four hours of
arrest."' The appellate court argued that the lower court
failed take into account the full panoply of rights afforded to a
detainee at arraignment in New York City: counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and compulsory process." 2 Other
benefits noted by the Second Circuit included: verification of identity"' and prior criminal history," 4 review of the arrest charges by supervisors in the Police Department and Prosecutor's
Office," 5 and an authorized plea offer at arraignment." 6
The Second Circuit found that these procedures provide checks
on police error, more reasonable and equitable bail determinations, and more dispositions when the detainees are produced at
arraignment. 117
The appellate court then looked to the Gerstein decision for
guidance on the outer limit of promptness. The Second Circuit
examined the sections of the American Law Institute's Pre07

1

Id. at 227.

108

Williams, 845 F.2d at 381.

'o9
Id. at 382.
110

Id. at 389.

111

Id.

112 Id. at 386-87.

13 Id. at 377.
114 Id.
115 Id.

116

Id. at 387.
117Id.
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Arraignment Code cited in Gerstein. Section 310.2(2) of the
Code requires scheduling a probable cause hearing within
twenty-four hours of arrest."' If the detainee contests probable cause, section 310.4 requires the court schedule a further
adjournment of forty-eight hours so that the detainee can be
provided with counsel and an in personam appearance." 9 The
Second Circuit also explored another Supreme Court decision,
21 which upheld a seventy-two hour delay
Schall v. Martin,1
between the initial appearance of a juvenile before a magistrate
and a hearing on the merits of the detention.' 2 ' From these
cases, the Second Circuit extrapolated that in New York County, seventy-two
hours was a permissible arrest to arraignment
1 22
time frame.
ii. Ninth Circuit'sRuling in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin
Criminal justice administrators in the urban area surrounding Los Angeles, California, faced the same problems producing
detainees as those confronting the police in New York City.
There were a record number of arrests, diminishing resources
for processing criminals," and a deteriorating urban infra-

'Is Id.

1 9 Id. at 387-88.
'
In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275 (1984), the Supreme Court
upheld the New York Family Court Act § 320.5(3)(b) (codified at JUD.
§ 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983)), which authorized detentiofis as long as six
days prior to production of the juvenile before a Family Court officer for a
probable cause hearing.
" The Supreme Court noted that at the first appearance, the presentment
agency must file with the Family Court a certificate of delinquency. Schall at
258 n.6; see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 310.1 (West 1983). "The petition must
contain a precise statement of each crime charged and... factual allegations
which clearly apprise the juvenile of the conduct which is the subject of the
accusation. Schall at 258 n.6.
' The Second Circuit observed in Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 389
(2d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989): "We do not suggest that
pre-arraignment delays of seventy-two hours are desirable. Our task is only
to define the range of constitutionally acceptable arraignment times in light of
Gerstein's recognition of 'the desirability of flexibility and experimentation by
the States.'"
' To accommodate rising caseloads, criminal justice administrators have
streamlined the arraignment procedures. In California, for example, in 1973,
the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was authorized to obtain from a
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structure in which the detainees must be transported and produced. 24 In August of 1987, Donald McLaughlin filed a class
action in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California against the County of Riverside and Cois
Byrd, individually and in his official capacity as the Sheriff of
Riverside. 12
As in the Williams complaint,1 26 McLaughlin
argued the violation of his civil rights and the civil rights of
others detained in the County jail resulting from delays in
arraignment. 127 The County moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of standing." District Court Judge Gadbois allowed
McLaughlin to add other persons who were presently detained
as plaintiffs to resolve
the standing issue and scheduled the
19
matter for a hearing.
Like New York, California pretrial procedures incorporate
the probable cause hearing into the arraignment and bail
proceedings.3
Unlike New York, California statutes set for-

misdemeanant collective waivers of certain constitutional rights, including the
right to counsel. Mills v. Municipal Court, 515 P.2d 273 (1973).
"4 In Youngblood v. Gates, 246 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1988), detainees contested
LAPD's practice of holding overnight those detainees against whom an
accusatory instrument had not been handed down by noon. This practice
resulted from a decision to send jail buses to the courts only in the morning.
LAPD justified this practice on the grounds that it would be prohibitively
expensive to keep an endless stream of buses in perpetual motion to deal with
the individualized treatment of thousands of prisoners.
The trial court refused to accept the county's reasoning and ordered
afternoon bus runs to the courts. This order was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second District which informed LAPD that inadequate
resources are not an excuse for holding thousands of unarraigned arrestees for
an extra day. Id.
" Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 1, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (No. 89-1817).
126See supra text accompanying note 101.
" McLaughlin's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil
rights was predicated on the County's failure to provide both a prompt
probable cause hearing and arraignment on the criminal court complaint. Id.

" The County of Riverside argued that under Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1982), petitioners had no standing under Article III of the United
States Constitution for seeking injunctive relief since the petitioner had not
alleged that he would be subject to the same improper use of force by the
police in the future. Brief for the Petitioners, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
3-4, Riverside (No. 89-1817).
" Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1666.
130 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 872, 991

(West 1985).
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ty-eight hours, excluding Saturday, Sunday, and Holidays, as
the outer parameter for production at arraignment. 31 The
further delay in Riverside resulted from the county policy of
delaying arraignment until the last day permissible under the
statute.3 2 Thus, a person arrested on a Wednesday evening
might not be arraigned until the following Monday - over one
hundred hours later. If an arrest fell on a holiday weekend, the
detention period, even prior to arraignment, could exceed one
hundred and twenty-four hours."
At the hearing before Judge Gadbois, petitioners presented
data from 1987 on the length of pre-arraignment detentions and
requested a preliminary injunction ordering detainees produced
within thirty-six hours of arrest." The defendants' motion in
opposition to the petition argued that the plaintiffs lacked
standing due to lack of evidence that the petitioners would
again be subject to the practices and procedures of which they
complained. 3 5 The defendants also asserted that according to
more recent data, the Riverside facility complied with Gerstein
and the California Penal Statutes. 3 ' Further, the defendants
argued that the proposed order would result in a costly duplicative layer of proceedings that would effectively prevent the state
from adopting uniform arraignment production proceedings.3 7

1 Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1665. There is presently conflicting case law

interpreting the term "forty eight hours" under CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (West
1985). In Youngblood, 246 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1988), the court interpreted forty-

eight hours to mean that defendants arrested at any time on one day must be
produced for arraignment on the second court date thereafter. Earlier case
law holds that when a defendant is arrested on a Thursday and Saturday and
Sunday are municipal holidays, the forty-eight hour limit expires just before
Monday midnight; therefore, defendant is properly arraigned on Tuesday
afternoon. People v Chambers, 80 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1969). While the Chambers
decision is at odds with the strictures of Riverside, since weekends can no

longer toll the forty-eight hour limitation on arrest processing time, the
Youngblood decision appears too strict an interpretation of the California Code
in light of the Supreme Court's definition of prompt processing in Riverside.
12 Joint Appendix, Volume 1 at 82, Riverside (No. 89-1817).
Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
1, Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1661 (No. 89-1817).
Joint Appendix, Volume 1 at 16, Riverside (No. 89-1817).
" Brief for the Petitioners, Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Riverside

'3

(No. 89-1817).
136

Id.

137 Id.
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Upon review of the record, Judge Gadbois found Riverside's
average processing time for arraignment within the outer limits
of the California statute.'" Nonetheless, Gadbois concluded
that factual evidence demonstrated that thirty-six hours provided the County with ample time to complete all administrative
steps necessary for arraignment.'3 9 Despite compliance with
state production statutes, the court ordered the County of
Riverside to provide arrestees with probable cause hearings
within thirty-six hours of arrest. 4 '
Riverside appealed this preliminary injunction to the Ninth
Circuit. Riverside's appeal was joined with an appeal from San
Bernardino County contesting a similar injunction.'
Both
counties contested the requirement that the probable cause
hearing must take place within thirty-six hours of arrest. San
Bernardino County also contested a district court
ruling man14 2
dating the physical production of detainees.
The Ninth Circuit held that Gerstein did not require an in
personam appearance by detainees; therefore, the court struck
down that part of the San Bernardino preliminary injunction
dictating physical production.'4 3 The Circuit Court did, however, agree with the lower court that Gerstein mandated a
probable cause hearing within thirty-six hours of arrest. Further, the Ninth Circuit, taking notice of several other court
decisions requiring a twenty-four hour production rule, suggested that twenty-four hours rather than thirty-six hours was the
outer limit of promptness under Gerstein.'" The counties of
"Riverside,
139

Id.

140

Id.

111 S. Ct. at 1661.

McGregor v. County of San Bernardino, 888 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1988)
(arising from a similar injunction issued by Judge Gadbois upon San
Bernardino County, California).
142 In McGregor, Judge Gadbois demanded not only more prompt probable
141

cause hearings, but also that San Bernardino County provide for the arrestees'
attendance at the probable cause hearing. Id.
' McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d at 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
144 The Ninth Circuit cited Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023,

1025 (9th Cir. 1983), in which the court upheld an injunction ordering that
probable cause hearings be held within twenty-four hours of arrest because
the facts produced at the hearing before the trial court indicated that no more
than twenty-four hours was required to complete the administrative procedures incident to arrest. The Ninth Circuit also noted that other circuits
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Riverside and San Bernardino filed a writ of certiorari. The
Supreme Court, because
of the split of authority in the Circuits,
45
accepted the writ.

iii. The United States Supreme Court'sDefinition of
Promptness: County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
In a split opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation of Gerstein in County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin.'" The majority, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, held that Gerstein permitted flexibility in state
production statutes. 4 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation, on
the other hand, wrongfully compelled states to relinquish this
right to experiment with procedures for expediting arrest
processing and conserving judicial resources.'
Further, the
Ninth Circuit opinion was found to result in judicial overreaching by forcing criminal justice administrators to burden citizens
with additional taxes to provide defendants expedited probable
cause hearings. 49 Such judicial mandates violate the doctrine
of federalism implicit in the United States Constitution. 50

agree. See Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, (7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Garza, 754 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1985); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Transit

Auth., 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir. 1989).
145 Riverside, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
146 1d. at 1668.
47

In Riverside, the majority noted that in contrast to the Fourth, Seventh
and Ninth Circuits' interpretation that Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, required a
probable cause determination immediately following completion of the administrative procedures incident to arrest, the Second Circuit understood Gerstein
to stress the need for flexibility and to permit states to combine probable cause
determinations with other pretrial proceedings. Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1666.
' 48 Id. at 1668.

. The majority criticized the minority's view that additional tax dollars
must be allocated to guarantee a detainee's right to prompt arrest processing:
In advocating a 24-hour rule, the dissent would compel Riverside
County - and countless other [counties] across the Nation - to
speed up its criminal justice mechanism substantially, presumably
by allotting local tax dollars to hire additional police officers and
magistrates. There may be times when the Constitution compels
such direct interference in local control, but this is not one.
Id. at 1670.
o0 Id. at 1668.
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Despite its deference to state legislatures, the Riverside
majority admitted that flexibility has its limits..' and that the
Gerstein "flexible time" criteria resulted in too much litigation. 5 2 Therefore, the Court ruled that forty-eight hours was
the outer limit for the production of detainees. 5 '
Where state arrest processing laws result in production of
arrestees within forty-eight hours of arrest, local officials are
immune from systemic attack on the constitutionality of those
statutes." However, the forty-eight hour time limitation will
not be strictly construed. In cases where local authorities can
substantiate that "extraordinary circumstances" or a "bona fide"
emergency required additional time for arrest processing,
continued detention of an arrestee may be deemed to have been
proper.' 5 Also, in cases where forty-eight hours has not yet
lapsed, an arrestee may successfully challenge local authorities
by proving that he has been held for improper reasons.5 6 For
example, the Court struck down the part of the California
statute that tolled arraignments on weekends when the court
As the majority aptly stated, "Gerstein is not a blank check. A state
has no legitimate interest in detaining for extended periods individuals who
have been arrested without probable cause." Id. at 1669.
152 The majority raised the concern that:
151

Unfortunately, as the lower courts in applying Gerstein have
demonstrated, it is not enough to say that probable cause determinations must be "prompt." This vague standard simply has not
provided sufficient guidance. Instead it has lead to a flurry of
systemic challenges to city and county practices, putting federal
judges in the role of making legislative judgments and overseeing
jail house operations.
Id. at 1669.
153
54

1

Id. at 1670.
Id.

...
Although the majority used the terms "extraordinary delays" and "bona
fide emergency," the majority also emphasized that:
[Ciourts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility [in evaluating
whether the delay is unreasonable in a particular case]. Courts
cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested
persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings
where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of
an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or
securing the premises of an arrest and other practical realities.
Id.
156 The majority noted the following improper reasons for detention: 1)
"delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence;" 2) "delay motivated
by ill will against the arrested individual;" 3) "delay for delay's sake." Id.
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was not in session, noting that intervening weekends do not
qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. 57
In Justice
Scalia's strong dissent, the minority argued that a probable
cause hearing is sufficiently prompt under Gerstein only when
there is a hearing immediately upon completion of the "administrative steps incident to arrest."'"
The dissent argued that
the majority's opinion struck at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures.' 5 9
Common law dictates that any person arrested without a warrant must be brought before a magistrate as soon as possible. 6 ° The only element bearing on the reasonableness of the
delay is the arresting officer's ability to reach a magistrate who
could issue the needed warrant for additional detention.' 6'
While the Riverside opinion laid to rest the arguments on
the outer limit of promptness and the configuration of a prearraignment hearing, the Court did not delineate the consequences of a Gerstein violation, nor did the Court define the
minimal conditions of pre-arraignment detention. Thus, resolution of these issues is left to others in the Gerstein decision.
iv. New York State Court of Appeals' Definition
of UnreasonableDelay under
People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown
The Riverside opinion mirrors the reasoning of the Second
Circuit in Williams by stating that, under Gerstein, the Fourth
Amendment permits flexibility which takes into account the
limited resources of the county criminal justice systems. 62 As
previously noted, the Second Circuit had reversed Federal
District Court Judge Motley's ruling that detainees must be
produced for arraignment within twenty-four hours of
arrest.'
The Second Circuit told Judge Motley that while
detainees were entitled to a prompt hearing, they were not

157 Riverside, 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
1

Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).

59

' Id. at 1672.
160Id.
1611d.

" Riverside, 111 S.Ct. at 1669-70; Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989).
16 Williams, 845 F.2d at 375-76.
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necessarily entitled to an ideal one."6 The Second Circuit.
also informed Judge Motley that the complexity of the tasks
facing New York City's criminal justice system made Motley's
demand for production within twenty-four hours unrealistic.'65
Oddly enough, just a few weeks prior to the Supreme Court's
Riverside decision, the New York Court of Appeals in People ex
rel. Maxian v. Brown vindicated the reasoning of Judge Motley
by affirming a trial court's order that all detainees must be arraigned within twenty-four hours unless the county provides an
acceptable reason for the delay."
Justice Brenda Soloff reviewed numerous writs, brought in
arraignment parts from January 3, 1990 until April 20, 1990 by
the Legal Aid Society, for each detainee held in excess of twenty-four hours. The basis for the demands was a statutory
requirement that an arrestee must be arraigned without unnecessary delay. 7 On April 20, 1990, Justice Soloff consolidated
these writs into a class action and granted the Legal Aid
Society's petition for relief."a
Any delay in excess of twenty-four hours is presumptively
unnecessary. 1 69 After twenty-four hours, the county has the
burden of proving that continued detention of the arrestee is not
unlawful.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, held
that the lower court's ruling enabled an arrestee to vindicate his
right to be arraigned without unnecessary delay.'
The appellate court also found that corrections officials have a burden

16

The Second Circuit criticized the District Court:

The district court's twenty-four hour limit on arraignment times
might perhaps be realistic if there were less crime and traffic in
New York City, or if, as the district court actually suggested, the
City's police did not "arrest so many and make the system so
overworked," or if the City had more police, courthouse detention
space, judges, prosecutors and Legal Aid lawyers. Whether New
York can establish an ideal arraignment system is not the issue
before us, however, for the Constitution does not compel it to do so.
Id. at 389.
165Id.
166

570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).

167N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
6

§ 140.20 (McKinney 1992).

203 N.Y.L.J. 26 (1990).

169 Id. at 27.
170 People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (N.Y. App. Div.

1990), affd, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
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of providing reasonable explanations for pre-arraignment
delay.' 1 Further, delays which are both reasonably foreseeable and avoidable are not necessarily within the meaning of
the statute, while unanticipated and unavoidable circumstances
would warrant a judicial extension of the statute. 7 2 A strong
presumption of regularity attaches to production for arraignment within twenty-four hours.'
The New York Court of
Appeals agreed with the lower courts that all arraignments
must take place within twenty-four hours of arrest. 7 4
II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES
IMPLEMENTED IN NEW YORK CITY TO
EXPEDITE ARRAIGNMENTS
As noted earlier, all prisoners have the right to be treated
humanely.'7 5 Unfortunately, the sheer volume of arrests in
New York City has frequently resulted in inhumane treatment
in overcrowded cells. 176 Some public officials believe that only
large infusions of money into the criminal justice system can
cure lengthy detentions under abominable conditions. They
attribute pre-arraignment delays to fiscal restraints imposed on
both New York City and New York State that have left criminal
justice administrators without the necessary resources to
afford
17
defendants speedy arraignments by traditional means. 1
171

Id., 561 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), affd, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y

1991).
..2Maxian, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 424.
173Id.

' 4 Maxian, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
175 Underlying the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
inhuman treatment is the prohibition against actions that offend the dignity

of the individual. This prohibition draws its meaning from evolving concepts
of decency that mark a maturing society. Tropez v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 10001 (1958).
176 The Appellate Division described the unconscionable circumstances of
pre-arraignment delay in New York City:
Abruptly severed from all that is familiar and sustaining in the
world they are used to travel, detainees are consigned, often in
chains, to chronically overcrowded and squalid holding facilities
where they will likely be subject to extraordinary physical and
emotional strain.
People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418, 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990),
affid, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
177 In Wachtler's report to the New York Legislature in 1990, he stated,

150 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.2:121
Meanwhile, many of the courthouses presently utilized for
criminal arraignments throughout New York City are woefully
inadequate for the production of large numbers of pre-arraignment detainees.'
The Queens County Supreme Court building in New York City, for example, was initially constructed for
use as a civil courthouse; consequently, many of the courtrooms
lack adequate holding pens for securing prisoners. Correction
officers, therefore, detain the arrestees in areas of the court-

house far from the courtrooms in which they must be produced.
Handcuffed prisoners are brought through public corridors to
the courtroom in which their case is to be heard. This manner
of production deprives the defendant of dignity and exposes the
public to potential harm should a prisoner escape his custodians.
When Justice Soloff issued her ruling, it was feared that
this decision would have a shattering impact on the criminal
justice system - a system that is already on the brink of
collapse after the dramatic rise in drug-related arrests. 9
However, between the issuance of Justice Soloff's order in April
1990 and a report issued in 1991, not only has the prosecution
routinely provided reasonable explanations for any arraignment
delay in excess of twenty-four hours, but the time for processing
arraignments in Manhattan has dropped from an average of
thirty-nine hours to an average of twenty-six hours.'
In large part, the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety's implementation of the recommendations of the ABCNY Committee on
Criminal Justice Operations and Budget (ABCNY Criminal
Justice Committee)' and of the Enforth Corporation for expe-

"Ilthe system does have a saturation point and we are dangerously near it."
Daniel Wise, Wachtler Calls System WNear Saturation: Suggests Anti-Crime,
Efficiency Measures, 204 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1990). Wachtler went on to say that in
1990 the number of drug indictments in New York City will reach 27,000, an
increase of 249% since 1985 and the New York City Criminal Court will
handle 300,000 arrest claims in 1990. Id.
1"8 The ABCNY Criminal Justice Report noted that there are inadequate
facilities at Central Booking (Manhattan) to hold all defendants at peak arrest
periods. Thus, while the paper package is being assembled, defendants are
routinely transported to any precinct until the package is complete. ABCNY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 50, at 176.
179 Wise, supra note 177, at 1.
Justice and Efficiency AfterArrest, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1991, at A16.
set forth in ABCNY CRIMINAL JusTICE REPORT, supra

181 Recommendations

note 50.
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diting arraignment processing has resulted in this decrease in
arraignment time.'8 2 The balance of this article discusses the
administrative, policy, and technical recommendations of these
two groups and suggests additional means for expediting prearraignment processing.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES
1. Creation of the PositionofArrest to
ArraignmentDirector
As previously noted, the arraignment process in New York
requires the synchronization of several independent government
agencies. Prior to 1990, the Coordinator of Criminal Justice
Services was primarily responsible for overseeing the work flow
between the various agencies. However, because the Coordinator did not directly control the staffing of the agencies nor the
priorities with which these agencies expended their funding, his
influence on these agencies was more persuasive than controlling. The oversight of the Coordinator of the Criminal Justice
Services is now backed by the authority of the newly created
position of Deputy Mayor of Public Safety. The Deputy Mayor
directly advises the Mayor on criminal justice issues and participates in the planning and implementation of the criminal justice
programs undertaken by criminal justice agencies of the City of
New York." To assist the Deputy Mayor in his goals, he has
hired a city-wide Arrest to Arraignment (ATA) Director who
reports directly to him.'
The ATA Director is responsible for overseeing long term
strategic planning for the entire arrest to arraignment process
in each of the boroughs. The ATA Director evaluates and
recommends changes in city-wide policies. He has a staff of
Assistant Directors placed in the boroughs of Brooklyn, Bronx,
"82Enforth was selected in a competitive bid process in New York City and
worked under the joint supervision of the Office of the New York City Criminal Justice Coordinator and the New York City Office of Management and
Budget. The results of this study appear in Enforth Corporation, A Systematic
Analysis of the Arrest to ArraignmentProcess: FinalRecommendations (on file
with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy) [hereinafter Enforth
Report].
183 Mollen Affidavit at 1, Brief for Corporation Counsel, People ex rel.
Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
'8

Id. at 7.
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Manhattan, and Queens who insure that these policies are
implemented." 8
The Deputy Mayor and the ATA Director have the power of
the purse over the agencies processing pre-arraignment detainees. For example, when Enforth recommended that additional
complaint room staff were needed to speed the arrest to arraignment process, the Deputy Mayor had at his disposal
fumding for the staffing of the four District Attorney's complaint
86

rooms.1

2. Centralized Confinement of Paper-readyDetainees
Prior to August 1990, even when the police had record
numbers of detainees in processing, filling the court cells was
difficult because the prisoners had to be segregated by sex and
age."" Enforth recommended that NYPD group detainees by
crime classification and readiness to be arraigned before bringing them to court pens."8 Following this recommendation,
NYPD now uses holding pens at various locations near the
courthouse to pre-sort classes of detainees prior to their production in the courthouse holding cells. 189

B. POLICY CHANGES: ISSUING OF MORE DESK
APPEARANCE TICKETS

Both the ABCNY Criminal Justice Committee and Enforth
recommended that arresting officers, rather than taking certain
classes of criminals into custody, issue more Desk Appearance
Tickets (DATs), a significant policy change."9 DAT arrestees
are scheduled to return for arraignment several weeks after
185 Id.
86

1

Id.

187 N.Y.

CORRECT. LAw § 500-b (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992). Police are

mandated to segregate adult men, women, adolescent boys and girls, remanded prisoners and known homosexuals. This statute has been extended until
September 1993.
" Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 2-22.
189

Travis Aff. at 5, Brief for Corporation Counsel, People ex rel. Maxian v.

Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
" N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 150.20 (McKinney 1992) states that when a
person is arrested for an offense other than a class A, B, C, or D felony or

certain other offenses, the arresting officer may issue an appearance ticket
instead of holding for arraignment.
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arrest. Therefore, the production of prior criminal history
sheets and complaints can be assigned a low priority. When
there is little backlog, the arresting officer can report to the
complaint room. DAT fingerprint cards can then be classified at
a time of relatively low on-line arrest workload. Further, the
defendant is not occupying limited cell space, thereby eliminating competition for scarce cells.'
Prior to May 1990, statistics from the OLBS indicated that
only 25% of all misdemeanor and virtually none of class E felon
arrestees were issued DATs. 92 Policies of the NYPD precluded issuing DATs to those with outstanding warrants, those
without verifiable community ties, those excluded due to provisions in the police department Patrol Guide, and those violating
"special precinct conditions.' 93
The Deputy Mayor recommended to the Police Commissioner more restrictive threshold standards for taking persons into
custody. After this recommendation, OLBS records indicate an
100% increase in the number of misdemeanants given DATs
rather than incarcerated prior to arraignment.'9 4 This policy
is presently under review because of the large percentage of
warrants among those receiving DATs. 9 5
Two other Enforth policy recommendations appear promising: the setting of bail at the precincts' 9 6 and expediting the
arraignments of certain classes of misdemeanants.'9 7 Both

9

" Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 3-2.
192 Id.
193

Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 3-3.
" Mollen Af. at 7, 8, Brief for Corporation Counsel, People ex rel. Maxian
v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
195 Interview with Michelle Maxian, Legal Aid Society, New York, N.Y.
(March 15, 1992).
196 Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 3-4 to 3-6. The ABONY Criminal
Justice Committee also recommended jail house bail, dismissing the advice of
administrators that the presence of funds at the precinct might corrupt the
staff. ABONY CRuIMNAL JusTicE REPORT, supra note 50, at 189-90.
19 Enforth recommended the expedited arraignment of misdemeanants
through a single arraignment part, operating either sixteen or twenty-four
hours a day, with its own associated holding space located adjacent to Central
Booking. After arrest and paperwork processing at the arrest precinct, those
defendants charged with misdemeanors who show no active warrants on a
local warrant check, yet denied DATs, would be taken to the expedited
arraignment facility. Upon arrival, they would be placed in a holding cell
while the arresting officer submits his paperwork to the booking staff. Upon
1
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policies are still under consideration by the Deputy Mayor's
Office.

C. TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT MODERNIZED
1. IncreasedAutomation in Identification Techniques
In 1978, New York State became one of the first states to
access fingerprints through computerization. This information
system is statewide and accesses the National Computer Information Center, which tracks out-of-state warrants. While
innovative at the time it was developed, this system relies on
technology and procedures that in some instances are now
technically obsolete. 9 '
Inkprinting is the technique currently used by NYPD to
generate fingerprints. A police officer obtains prints from a
defendant by placing the defendant's fingers on an ink pad and
then rolling the fingers on a white index card. The officer then
manually types onto this card additional identifiers, such as the
defendant's name, address, and social security number. This
card is faxed to DCJS where a staff member of the DCJS again
manually inputs the identification information into the DCJS
mainframe computer. From a database of more than four
million fingerprints, the mainframe produces a number of
possible matches which the DCJS technician visually compares
with those on the fax. Where a match is produced, the computer generates the defendant's prior New York State criminal
history, which is faxed to the Central Booking Unit.'9 9
DCJS estimates that faxing to Albany and analyzing the
print takes about forty-five minutes and another two to three

completion of arrest-related paperwork, the complaint would be drawn upon
site by an ADA, a paralegal, or the arresting officer. Once the complaint had
been drawn up, the arrestee would be interviewed by defense counsel and
arraigned.
Advantages of this system are: (1) logistics are simplified since this
defendant is moved directly from the precinct of arrest to the arraignment
facility; (2) the complaint generation process is simplified by eliminating the
bottleneck at the Complaint Room; and (3) the identification procedure is
simplified, since a prior criminal history sheet will not be required. Enforth
Report, supra note 182, at 3-12 to 3-13.
19 8 ABCNY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 50, at 186-189.
199 Id.

at 187-88.
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hours to prepare a correct history for transmission. 200 NYPD
estimates the entire process takes about nine hours from the
first faxing of the prints to DCJS until the receipt of the information at NYPD.2 ° ' One statistic is certain, however: in May
of 1990, one of the most significant delays in the arrest to
arraignment process resulted from DCJS rejection of fingerprints. In 1990, as many as twenty-five percent of the fingerprint cards faxed for classification and identification to DCJS
were unreadable. 2 In some cases, reissuing the original card
resolved the problem. °3 In many cases, however, the detainee
had to be reprinted by a member of the NYPD Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI) before the DCJS computer could properly classify the fingerprints. 2 4
Enforth recommended that all NYPD officers receive better
initial training and periodic retraining in fingerprinting techniques. 2 " Enforth also suggested that a member of the BCI
team be assigned to each borough's Central Booking Unit. This
BCI officer would inspect each fingerprint card for readability
prior to faxing the card to DCJS. 2' Enforth also suggested
that using better transmitting equipment in the Central Booking Units. The purchase of more advanced fax equipment
resulted in a fifty percent 7decrease in the rejection rate of prints
20
sent by NYPD to DCJS.
DCJS is in the process of implementing an Automated
Fingerprint Information System (AFIS) to further eliminate
readability problems.20 ' Existing fax machines will be replaced by infrared processors which can read the prints, convert
them to digitized data, and transmit this data via phone lines
directly to the DCJS mainframe computer. 2' The DCJS main

2oo Id. at 188.
201 Id.
20

2 Enforth Report, supra note

182, at 2-10.

203 ABCNY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 50, at 188.
204 Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 2-11. ABCNY CRIMINAL JUSTICE

supra note 50, at 189.
" Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 2-11.
26 Id.
17 Mollen Affidavit at 8, Brief for Corporation Counsel, People ex rel.

REPORT,

Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
20

ABCNY

2M Id.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT,

supra note 50, at 188.
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frame computer will subsequently generate a list of ten to
fifteen potential identifications, identify a unique characteristic

in the NYPD print, and match the NYPD print with a print in
the DCJS database. 2" A DCJS technician will still manually
verify the match of the computer generated print with the
21
NYPD print. '
Switching to the newer technology has several advantages.
Less technical skill is required to photograph a finger than to
print a finger; therefore, this task could be delegated to any
properly trained person. The digitized image is sent directly
from the infrared processor to the computer at DCJS, thus
eliminating the procedure of photocopying and faxing the fingerprint. Readability problems are reduced because the processing
of the digitized print is done by the computer rather than by a
technician.
2. Micro-computer Work Stations
The use of desk top micro-computer work stations at DCJS,
and possibly at Central Booking, offers another solution to the
bottle neck of inkprint faxes between NYPD and DCJS. Although the desk top system could not access all four million
fingerprints on file with DCJS,2 12 these micro-computers could
access the prints of defendants with a predilection for certain
types of violent crimes, such as child molestation or rape, as
opposed to shoplifting or disorderly conduct. 213 Also, such
micro-computers can be programmed to locate habitual offenders of certain crimes, such as drunk driving.214 In addition,
micro-computer identification systems could target bench war-

21 0

1d.

211

Id. at 188-89.

Micro-computers lack the storage capacity required for all the information contained in the central DCJS computer. However, local bench warrants
and prior criminal history sheets on designated crimes or criminals could be
contained in a micro-computer.
213 Local verification of warrants would be appropriate only for misde212

meanants.

Additional verification of warrants must, of course, be done

afterwards through the state central warrant system.
214 This author, a former Assistant District Attorney in Kings County,
recalls that microcomputers have been used in the White Collar Crime Unit of
that office for targeting arson through the systematic recording of arson
locations, names of property owners, and insurance policies.
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rants for crimes committed in specific areas - for example, the
street turf of a gang or drug pushers.
When the fax lines between NYPD and DCJS are jammed,
these desk top work stations would provide an alternative to
processing prints through DCJS. Many defendants should be
granted a DAT under new NYPD guidelines, but they cannot
because their identity is in doubt. Backup micro-computers
would provide assurances that defendants of doubtful identity
are not presently wanted for a heinous crime prior to their
release.
3. Casetrackingof Pre-arraignmentDetainees
The New York City Police Department has also recently
implemented a casetracking system for pre-arraignment
detainees. This system keeps the police apprised of where a
particular defendant is within the arrest to arraignment system.
Such casetracking was not possible prior to the centralization of
administrative authority for the arrest to arraignment process
in the Deputy Mayor. The system also contains a mechanism to
detect potential backlogs triggered by a significant increase in
the number of arrests. When the mechanism is triggered, the
Deputy Mayor of Public Safety, the Office of Court Administration (OCA), the District Attorneys and the Legal Aid Society are
notified in order to prepare additional arraignment parts to
handle the backlog. 1 5
4. Creating One WarrantInformation Bank
Enforth also recommended, but the system has yet to
implement, that the courts no longer mandate that warrants be
issued by the Central Warrants Unit. 16 Presently, warrants
are issued by NYPD and OCA. A county clerk makes a handwritten notation of the warrant in a log under the warrant's
issue date. When a warrant search is required, the clerk
searches the warrant log and locates the indictment number
and bench warrant notation. The clerk manually prepares a
warrant and takes it to the Chief Clerk to be notarized. The
clerk then faxes the notarized warrant to the court holding the

215 Travis Affidavit at 7, Brief for Corporation Counsel, People ex rel.
Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991).
21 6
Enforth Report, supra note 182, at 2-8.
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detainee. Occasional breakdowns of fax equipment have caused
massive tie-ups in arraignment processing.2 17
Enforth recommended that courts simplify the system by
authorizing the receipt of warrants generated from one on-line
warrant system. The warrant would be verified by an affidavit
of authenticity from the Chief Clerk of the issuing county.2 1
This on-line system would include the warrants issued by the
courts, the police and the state, thereby eliminating duplicative
paperwork and expediting the arraignment of detainees with
outstanding warrants.
5. ProducingPre-ArraignmentDetainees Electronically
The ABCNY Criminal Justice Committee recommends
another technical innovation: the use of closed circuit televisions and microwave systems to produce defendants electronically.2 19 Several jurisdictions, including Riverside, California,
routinely arraign detainees electronically.2 ° The New York
State legislature has statutorily authorized video arraignments
in Suffolk County 2 ' and has recently passed a temporary
statute authorizing video production in the Bronx, Kings and
217 Id. at 2-7.
218
219

Id. at 2-8.
ABCNY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 50, at 181-183.

o Among the numerous jurisdictions that have been authorized to video
arraignments are the counties of:
1) Fairbanks, Alaska, pursuant to ALASKA CRIM. R. 38.2;
2) Maricopa and Pima, Arizona, ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 14.2;
3) Numerous counties in California, including Riverside, San
Bernardino, and Glendale, pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE §§
977, 977.2 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992);
4) Dade County, Florida, pursuant to FLORIDA CT. R. 3.160;
5) Ada County, Idaho, pursuant to IDAHO CRIM. R. 43.1;
6) Baton Rouge, Louisiana, pursuant to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 831, 833 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990);
7) Cole County, Missouri, pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. 561.031
(West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
221 New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 185.10-185.40 (McKinney 1985)
were added by the Laws of 1978. The Office of Court Administration failed to
implement video arraignments prior to the expiration of the act in 1983.
The Court's concern with due process safeguards (including the sending
and receiving of images within the territory or county in which the arraignment judge is authorized to hear cases and the blocking of unauthorized
receptions or interference) has resulted in inordinate costs and delays from the
inefficiency of physical production at arraignments.
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New York Counties for a period of eighteen months.2 ' However, Chief Administrator Wachtler has not taken the necessary
steps to make video arraignments operational in New York City,
based, in part, on his opposition to the restrictions set forth in
the legislation.2" That these counties have thus far been deprived of the great success video arraignments have enjoyed in
other jurisdictions is unfortunate.
It is hoped that the Chief Administrator will either reverse
his decision or that the legislature will pass legislation that the
Administrator wants implemented in his courthouses. City
administrators should, nonetheless, investigate the diverse
electronic production procedures of other jurisdictions for. a
prototype that adequately protects the due process rights of the
accused.
CONCLUSION
As noted in Part I of this article, the Riverside decision has
set a national outer limit of forty-eight hours for detention
absent a probable cause hearing. Many states already have
more narrow time frames for production of detainees at arraignment. Fundamental decency and financial constraints mandate
short production times. A record number of arrests dictate that
those dollars spent on criminal justice be spent wisely. Criminal justice administrators should withdraw a case as quickly as
possible from the bloated court calendars if it cannot survive
even a cursory reading for probable cause.
Part II of this article gave an overview of the policies and
procedures followed in the pre-arraignment system in New York
City. Criminal justice administrators throughout the nation
should take heart. If arraignment time can be reduced by forty
percent in New York City, all manner of miracles are possible in
other jurisdictions.

2 New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 182.10-182.40 (McKinney Supp.
1992), authorize electronic appearances as an alternate method of court

appearances in Westchester and all counties in New York City, except Staten
Island. This statue became effective January 1, 1991 and is effective until
July 1, 1993. Despite the legislature's desire to utilize video procedures, the

Chief Administrator of the Courts has not drawn up court rules for the
administration of this video production statute. See Peter Preiser, Practice
Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 182.10, 182.40 (McKinney Supp.
1992).
Wachtler, supra note 1, at 42.
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Perplexed judges and criminal justice administrators should
examine those procedures recently implemented in the courts of
New York City. In 1991, spurred by federal and state challenges to existing arrest processing procedures, both minor technical
and radical policy changes recommended by Enforth and the
ABCNY Criminal Justice Committee were implemented. These
changes have not only saved taxes badly needed by a collapsing
court system, but they have also secured the rights of detainees.
The New York Times reported on March 11, 1991, that New
York City administrators had reduced the average arrest processing time from thirty-nine hours to twenty-six hours.2 24
New York City is one of the more complex and busier
criminal justice systems. It is not fully representational of other
municipalities. However, the sheer size of the area and the
volume of business involved strongly suggests that the lessons
learned here may be successfully implemented elsewhere.

22 Justice and Efficiency After Arrest, supra note 180.

